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GUIDO CALABRESI
Policy Goals of the ~~Swedish Alternative"
In the following remarks, I shall try to outline: (a) where the
Swedish approach fits in a theoretical scheme of accident law, and
(b) some things that can be said in favor and against that fit. Be-
cause it is my own, and because I find it difficult to think about acci-
dent law differently, I shall use a variant of the outline of accident
law goals which I originally presented many years ago in The Costs
of Accidents.! I shall quickly describe these, and then see how, and
how well or on what bases, the Swedish approach attempts to meet
these goals. The goals of accident law in this schema are the follow-
ing five:
(1) A deterrence or safety goal-the object of which is to re-
duce the sum of accident costs and safety costs, or, in other words, to
achieve the optimum level of safety. This goal assumes that some
accidents, some injuries, some harms are not under existing technol-
ogy worth avoiding. It also does not necessarily measure costs in a
strictly economic way, and indeed, when I apply that goal, I cer-
tainly do not so measure them. (So a particularly painful or offen-
sive injury may be worth avoiding even though the safety costs are
significant, while another injury which has the same economic con-
sequences to the injured party may not be worth avoiding because it
entails lower "moral" or "non-economic" costs.)
(2) A spreading or compensation goal. The object of this goal
is to see to it that no individual or company is so crushed by having
to bear accident costs (or for that matter safety-that is, accident
avoidance-costs) as to result in significant additional harm to him-
self or the society. It is also to see to it that safety and accident costs
do not alter the economic status of injurer or victim dramatically-
for such dramatic changes in wealth themselves are costly.
(3) A moral-distributional goal. The object of this goal is to
put the burden of accident costs and of safety costs (accident avoid-
ance costs) on those who by reason of their behavior, or their rela-
tionship to the injurer or victim, ought (other things being equal) to
bear them. This goal not only raises fault issues, but also raises is-
sues of the desirability of individual responsibility between a given
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injurer and a given victim regardless of fault, and issues of vicarious
responsibility for the acts of others.
(4) A general distributional goal. The object of this goal is to
put the burden of accident costs and of safety costs on those who are
most suited to bear them either by reason of wealth or status in that
society. In a sense this goal takes cognizance of the fact that any
system of accident law can be viewed as a tax system and its desira-
bility must be gauged also by its fairness when so viewed. Do those
categories of people who are relatively wealthy bear their share of
safety or accident costs? Are those activities (like land owning in
19th century England) which the general tax system favors similarly
favored? Are those activities which, on account of status or relative
capacity to pay, are financially disfavored in that society similarly
burdened by that society's accident law? These are the questions
this goal raises.
(5) (And finally), an efficiency goal. The object of this goal is
to achieve the mixture of other goals desired by a given society in as
inexpensive a fashion as possible. That is, of course, the only valid
meaning of efficiency. Too many discussions of accident law sound
as though efficiency were a goal in itself, without asking what it is
that is being accomplished efficiently. They make as little sense as
would a discussion which praised the efficiency of a society in its
production of bananas, and which ignored the fact that the members
of that society despised bananas and had no effective way of selling,
elsewhere, the bananas produced.
One more word before turning to the Swedish approach in rela-
tion to each of these goals, and that word is, of course, Justice. Jus-
tice, or fairness, remains what the goal of accident law must be. The
goals I have outlined are parts of what in any given legal system
goes into achieving a just result in accident law. It is not justice for
accidents, which can be prevented at a reasonable cost, to occur, but
it is not just justice for everyone in a society to be significantly
worse off in order to avoid each and every accident. It is not justice
for someone to be crushed by accidents (unless another goal requires
such crushing). For many, it is not justice for the poor to bear the
same burden as the rich, just as in 19th century England it was not
just for landowners to bear the same burdens as manufacturers. Is
it just for a person who was injured by someone else's fault to re-
ceive the same compensation as a person who was not; for all to re-
ceive the same compensation for the same injury regardless of the
behavior of the injurer? Many differ on this. Finally, it is not just
to have a system of accident law which wastes the precious time and
resources of the society in order to accomplish what could, through
other approaches, be achieved more efficiently.
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The justice of a system of accident law depends, both at the be-
ginning and at the end, in how well it amalgamates these (and other
unmentioned) ultimately inconsistent goals as they are defined and
worked out in any given society. For this reason any evaluation of
an approach like Sweden's must be precarious. Who can say-ex-
cept those in the country itself-that the particular mixture of in-
consistent goals achieved by the Swedish approach is wrong? The
goals are inconsistent with each other. Thus, perfect spreading may
give extraordinarily poor safety/deterrence. Optimal deterrence
may burden the poor or some disadvantaged minorities intolerably.
Perfect spreading, or optimal deterrence, may result in a treatment
of wrongdoers that is utterly inconsistent with treatment deemed
appropriate for like behavior in other areas of law (like criminal
law), and so on. Each society must finds its own mixture of goals
and achieve them as efficiently as it can. Moreover, what is efficient
depends not only on a simplistic calculus of costs and benefits, but
also on what is likely to work within a given economy and political
system. (The New Zealand approach would in some countries, like
the U.S., quite possibly be used to give hidden subsidies, that would
not otherwise be acceptable, to certain categories-like the trucking
industry, because of the nefarious political influence of the Team-
sters Union. If so, that plan, which might be efficient in New Zea-
land, might not be so in the U.S., since to guard against its
corruption would entail huge costs.)
Nevertheless, some things can be said about the Swedish ap-
proach. One can describe how it seems to deal with the different
goals and the weight it seems to give to each of them. And one can
raise questions whether it really means to do some things that it
seems to be doing. It is to these things that I will now turn.
The characteristics that strike me most about Sweden's ap-
proach as described by Professor Hellner are the following. First,
the basic economic costs of accidents are met by a system of general
social insurance. Spreading, wealth distributional considerations,
and reduction of costs of administration seem of primary concern
with respect to these costs, which seem to play no role in inducing
safety either at an individual level or at an industry-activity level.
They are not a part of the cost that a pharmaceutical manufacturer
must consider in making decisions on what safety devices are worth-
while. They are not a part of the decisions a car owner faces in
choosing one car rather than another, because they do not affect the
cost of insurance for the cars. Nor do they influence the number of
drivers or their ages. This would not be so were the social insurance
funds derived through taxation of categories of injurers and victims
according to their propensity to give rise to such basic economic
costs. Nor would it be so if these costs were not subtracted from the
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recoveries obtained under the various specific insurance approaches
described by Oldertz. As it is, they are treated like ordinary costs of
living or unavoidable illnesses, etc.,-costs which should not affect
the level of activities or accident-safety decisions, and which, in a so-
cial-democratic-welfare state, should be borne by the collectivity and
paid for through ordinary taxes.
As to these, questions of who, on account of behavior, ought to
pay seem to be treated as irrelevant, as are issues concerning indi-
vidual links between injurer and victims. One assumes that both the
desire to burden individual wrongdoers and the desire to take into
account the riskiness of activities with respect to such basic injury
costs are dealt with outside of accident law. For such basic injury
costs are not in fact like unavoidable illnesses-many could be
avoided at a price. Moreover, some individuals (both injurers and
victims) by their behavior and by their activities disproportionately
increase the risk of such basic injury costs occurring. It is implausi-
ble that Sweden takes no heed of this, and so one assumes that there
exists both a complex system of governmental safety regulations
designed to achieve an optimal mix of accident and safety costs (with
respect to basic injuries) and a system of criminal and semi-criminal,
uninsurable, penalties designed to punish those whose behavior is
unduly risky with respect to such costs.
Were this the entire Swedish system, it would be fairly simple,
intelligible, logical, and intellectually uninteresting. It would be one
in which the safety/deterrence goal was met by collectively imposed
fines and regulations, in which all "wrongdoers" would be burdened
in a similar manner, in which compensation-spreading would be
achieved by a unitary decision as to what burdens should not be
borne individually but should instead be socialized, and in which the
wealth-status goals would be served by assessing taxes to pay for the
social insurance programs on the appropriate wealth-status
categories.
What makes the Swedish system worth discussing is instead the
fact that many of the goals that are ignored in its treatment of basic
accident injuries return into play when one deals with extra injury
costs and especially pain and suffering costs. But before I turn to
how these goals re-enter into play, I would like to emphasize one
thing. The fact that one splits accident costs, so that different parts
are allocated to serve different goals, is not in itself either good or
bad. It is a complication, but the goals to be served are also complex
and inconsistent. There is nothing intrinsically bad (except that
complexity usually brings expense) in such a split. Nor would there
be in the opposite split. That is, one could conceive of a system in
which basic injury costs were assigned so as to achieve deterrence/
safety, while catastrophic or non-economic costs were sought to be
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spread, their risks being controlled through regulation and punish-
ment. Still, it is a matter of great significance that the Swedish sys-
tem, without in any way wishing to undercut its commitment to a
regulation-spreading wealth distribution approach for basic accident
costs, finds it worthwhile to go beyond that approach and does it in a
quite unusual way.
This leads to the second characteristic of the Swedish approach,
and that is its extraordinary reliance on private insurance arrange-
ments to achieve a combination of goals that in other places is
thought best achieved through public arrangements together with
state insurance. The degree to which Sweden has abandoned indi-
vidual litigation, together with fault, defect, and even extra-hazard
as a basis for liability, is usually thought to imply a public insurance
framework. It obviously does so when the object is primarily to
spread losses (as in Sweden for basic injury costs), but it also does so
when the object is not just compensation but the achievement of
compensation and of safety/deterrence, regardless of fault or
pseudo-fault, through the allocation of accident costs.
Thus, one might have expected a public fund from which those
who were injured could automatically recover their extra-tort
size-damages, to be established. And one would have expected that
this fund, instead of being fed by general taxes (like the basic social
insurance fund), would be created by taxing those activities (perhaps
even those individual acts), whether of injurers or of victims, which
were found statistically to be disproportionate causes of such extra
damages. These taxes would serve to induce the desired level of ex-
tra care, while the payments from the fund would yield the desired
degree of compensation.
What is unusual, and unusually interesting, about the Swedish
approach is that it rejects this way, at the same time that it rejects
the notion that whether or not extra damages are justified depends
on the particular behavior of the individual injurer or victim, which
is a private matter between them. For reasons that 1 cannot go into
here, 1 am in full sympathy with the idea that any system that at-
tempts to link extra damages (or basic damages, for that matter) to
the behavior of the individual injurer and victim is deeply flawed.
So 1 reject and have long rejected the traditional private fault or
semi-fault based approaches that are still common in many coun-
tries. 1 am also commmitted to the notion that at least in many ar-
eas accident law has an important role to play in achieving safety/
deterrence and not merely compensation. (1 have been skeptical of
this primarily in medical cases and so find Sweden's emphasis on
category deterrence in patient cases particularly interesting.) But 1
had always assumed that the successful achievement of the safety-
deterrence goal, once fault and semi-fault were abandoned, was
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bound to lead to a public fund, with equal payment for equal injuries
to victims, and assessments of taxes on victim and injurer activities
according to their statistical accident proneness.
Under this approach, the bathtub accident would lead to a simi-
lar payment as the automobile or work accident, and from the same
fund. But while the fund would draw its moneys by taxing the in-
jurer category in work accidents (i.e., from the employer), and by
taxing a mixed injurer-victim category in auto accidents (i.e., from
the car owner-who might be either injurer or victim), it would, in
the bathtub accident, draw its moneys predominantly from a victim
category (i.e., the owner of the house who would be charged a tax on
home-owning based on bathtub and analogous risks). The effect
would be to achieve spreading-compensation by paying the individ-
ual victim, and deterrence/safety by charging an appropriate tax to
the victim or injurer activities most linked to the harm. This tax
would (if deterrence/safety were significantly achieveable) induce
structural choices for safety. (Homeowners would find that houses
with showers were taxed at lower rates than those with tubs, and
tubs with rails would lead to lower taxes than tubs without rails.
These tax differences might be accentuated when the homeowner
(or her family) was of a particularly bathtub accident prone age.) If
no activity-whether injurer, victim, or mixed-were statistically
linked to greater accident proneness, the fund-tax would automati-
cally, by definition almost, become a general one, and the accident
risk would automatically be treated as a socialized risk of living.
Sweden attempts an analogous mixture of compensation and
category safety/deterrence, with an analogous lack of interest (by
and large) as to individual behavior, but does it privately, and only
for those categories in which such safety-deterrence seems worth
having or where special spreading needs are perceived. There are
both advantages and'disadvantages to doing it this way. The clearest
advantage is that by employing essentially private insurance devices
and rates that are presumably actuarially set, the Swedish approach
avoids the danger of hidden political tinkering with the amounts
charged to risk-prone categories. I mentioned earlier how, in the
United States, I would expect that any accident compensation fund
that sought to tax injurer and victim activities according to their ac-
cident propensity would quickly be corrupted by political pressures.
Highly accident-prone activities, like trucking would, in my judg-
ment, quickly obtain relief in their rates because of alleged "national
security needs" based on political clout.
I do not mean that subsidies to high risk groups are not ever ap-
propriate. If a disadvantaged minority group had unusually high au-
tomobile accident rates a society might choose to tax the members of
this group less than the amount "justified" by the statistical risk re-
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quired to fund the goal. It might opt for fewer safety incentives and
for more accidents in order not to stigmatize the group. Herein lies
a possible disadvantage of the Swedish approach. Insofar as it was
thought undesirable to charge higher fees to certain categories of
employers, drivers, or pharmaceutical producers (despite their
higher risks), a private system has more trouble subsidizing the cate-
gory than would a public system. That is simply the opposite side of
the coin of the advantage the private system has in being relatively
free from political pressure.
The second advantage of the Swedish approach is that by being
limited to specific areas it does not need to compensate the world
fully in order to achieve its aims. The fund approach, in effect, com-
pensates everyone to an equal extent in order to create a system of
incentives on those categories (perhaps few) in which allocations of
accident costs may lead to significantly better safety/deterrence re-
sults. The Swedish approach selects out a few areas where such al-
locations seem likely to be significant and does not bother with the
rest. That it does so under the rubric of seeking those areas in
which extra compensation and extra charges seem "fair", rather
than by focusing directly on deterrence, is of little consequence ex-
cept that it adds insult to injury for those not receiving the extra
compensation. The decisions made on whom to charge, with few ex-
ceptions, reek with the underlying aim of charging those who can
control the risks and choosing between safety and accident costs. It
is in these cases that extra/compensation is deemed appropriate,
while in other cases the victims are not deemed deserving of extra
compensation.
Unless, however, the decision is explicitly linked to safety/de-
terrence grounds, one is bound to feel that the choice of who re-
ceives extra compensation is haphazard and unprincipled. There is,
moreover, another concomitant disadvantage of creating different
categories of injured parties who are treated differently. For such
an approach inevitably leads to borderline problems. It is bound to
be the case that individual victims will try very hard to describe
their injuries as being within or outside a given category in order to
increase their chances of recovery. This process entails case-by-case
determinations.
Such case-by-case decisions are not only expensive, but also lead
to results that are apt to be myopic. Contrast how a fund would
treat transfusion hepatitis with how such hepatitis is treated in Swe-
den. The Swedish decision is that hepatitis cannot be avoided by
testing blood in certain types of cases; hence the victim must bear
the extra damages. (I could say, instead, "Hence there is no sense
charging hospitals in order to induce them to take greater care in
transfusions.") The fund, instead, would charge the hospitals be-
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cause no class of victims, no victim category, suitable to bear the tax
would appear to be as closely linked statistically to the injury as the
hospitals. If, in fact, no test for hepatitis were feasible, under a fund
approach all hospitals would end up charging the same to all blood
recipients in order to cover their tax, and blood recipients would
treat this as a cost of their illness. Were it the case, however, that a
test for hepatitis blood could be developed (unbeknownst to the
panel that decided the Swedish case), the fund would have created
incentives-missing in the Swedish system-to develop the test.
Often in reading the patient insurance cases, I was convinced
that the Swedish approach was correct in its difficult judgments on
whether the cost was more properly of the underlying illness (that
is, of the patient) or whether it derived from the type of medical
care received. But sometimes I was far from sure and wondered
whether the (for me) odd result was based on too much attention to
the individual case, and too little to which category-victim or in-
jurer-could act, at a structural or research level, effectively to re-
duce the risk. In other words, the case-by-case decisions implicit,
especially in the pharmaceutical and patient areas, seemed to have
an occasional flavor of semi- or pseudo-fault to them, whereas the
whole point of the system was to assign costs regardless of fault rea-
sons. A statistically-based involvement tax, under a fund approach,
would avoid this problem.
Someone may, however, say that I miss the whole point and
that the object of the entire system is compensation and not cost as-
signment. And certainly the discussions speak frequently of
whether the victim ought to be compensated by tort-size damages. I
cannot, though, accept that as underlying the system, for I cannot
understand why many of the victims chosen should receive much
larger compensation than others for analogous injuries, except be-
cause it would lead to better safety/deterrence decisions. Indeed, if I
believed that the system was, in fact, designed primarily to grant ad-
ded compensation to some victims who deserved more, I would find
the approach irrational. Compensation can playa role-thus the de-
cision throughout to ignore minor injuries can be easily justified on
compensation as well as on administrative cost grounds. But if com-
pensation were the dominant fact, then the third characteristic of
the Swedish system, namely, that similar individuals injured in dif-
ferent contexts receive widely differing recoveries, would be close to
absurd.
Severity of pain, and severity of injury generally, would justify
different levels of compensation. Some categories of activity may
well be sufficient centers of severe or severely painful injuries to
justify separate treatment from other activities on these grounds.
But there is no indication that the activities chosen in Sweden are
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the only, or the principal, ones that should be selected on this basis.
Rather, the differential in compensation that the Swedish system
maintains must in practice justify itself, as it does again and again-
though beneath the surface, and in ways that relate to the relative
capacity for making choices between safety and accidents, and not
truly in ways that relate to compensation. Whenever it is suggested
that compensation is not justified, it is easy to find behind the state-
ment the implicit belief that the injurer could do little or nothing to
avoid the harm even if given incentives to do so.
Nevertheless, there is not complete clarity on the matter.
There is at one point the suggestion that an advantage of one of the
insurance plans is that it doesn't differentiate in rates among differ-
ent injurers on the basis of their risk/loss experience. That surely
would be wrong on safety/deterrence grounds, and justifiable only
on spreading grounds, and even then only if needed in order to avoid
crushing the injurers. Similarly, one might ask whether, if safety/
deterrence grounds were as important to the approach as I have sug-
gested, one could justify the purely social insurance manner of treat-
ing basic economic losses. Why, one might ask, should incentives for
safety be limited to exposure to extra pain and suffering-type dam-
ages? The purist from the University of Chicago would certainly
question that. This troubles me less, for I find it quite possible to
assume that the basic deterrence/safety decision is achieved in Swe-
den through regulation, and the insurance plans work only to induce
the extra or marginal safety that pain and suffering-type costs may
make appropriate.
What, however, for me ultimately indicates that deterrence/
safety is at the root of the Swedish approach are the differences
among the different private plans described. In both the automobile
and workplace injury cases, compensation is virtually automatic, but
in workplace injuries the burden is on the injurer, while in the auto
cases it is a first-party, victim burden (except as to bicyclists and
pedestrians). Both the automaticity and the choice of parties to bur-
den make enormous sense from a deterrence/safety point of view in
these classes of cases. I have written at length elsewhere why first
party or owner-victim insurance is appropriate in car cases from a
deterrence point of view.2 Many have expressed the same thought
with respect to injurer (third party) liability in workplace accidents.
Automaticity, instead, makes very little sense in patient or
pharmaceutical cases, even though it might well do so if compensa-
tion-spreading were the object. In both areas, user choices are often
2. Calabresi, "First Party, Third Party, and Product Liability Systems: Can
Economic Analysis of Law Tell Us Anything About Them?," 69 Iowa L. Rev. 833
(1984).
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important-though much less so in the pharmaceutical area than in
the patient area (a fact again reflected in the different treatment ac-
corded to each area in Sweden). Indeed, in the patient area I and
others have questioned whether there is any point to a safety/deter-
rence goal at all (our suggestion being that the added pressures to
safety are sufficiently slight, while the decisions on when they are
appropriate are sufficiently difficult, so that it may be worthwhile
abandoning the goal in this area and limiting ourselves to achieving
that general level of spreading which seems societally warranted).3
The reason for my skepticism is not that incentives do not work in
the patient injury area, but that they often create concomitant
wrong incentives-what in the United States goes by the name of
defensive medicine. Sweden strives quite impressively to decide, on
a faultless case-by-case basis, what type of medical maloccurrences
ought to be charged to medical care, and what, instead, are costs of
the underlying illness. Though full of admiration for the attempt, I
remain somewhat skeptical whether the game is worth the candle.
Still, that is to the side of my point, which is, once again, that were
the object compensation-spreading no real reason would suggest it-
self for the different treatment among these four "special insur-
ance" categories, just as none presents itself for differentiating these
four from the rest of the world of injuries. The moment one focuses
instead on the safety/deterrence goal to be achieved by creating
structural incentives for categories rather than by motivating indi-
viduals in their last-minute decisions, the distinctions the Swedish
approach makes become quite plausible, even if not always alto-
gether convincing.
In the end, though, one must still ask whether the whole rather
complex system is worth it. It clearly is not if one focuses primarily
on the spreading-compensation, or on the wealth-status distribution
goals. Then the Swedish treatment of basic injury costs, enlarged or
not, is the appropriate model. Similarly, it is not worth it if one fo-
cuses on the moral-distributional goal. Then an enlargement of
criminal sanctions or the creation of uninsurable tort fines for
wrong-doers would be the appropriate route. To some, though not
to me, the preservation and expansion of negligence-based,
traditonal tort notions might also be appropriate. The question that
remains, then, is does the Swedish approach justify itself because of
the way it furthers the deterrence/safety goal? It is to this that I
shall address my final observations.
First, I would note that compared to automatic compensation
from a governmental fund with taxes assessed on the appropriate
3. Calabresi, "The Problem of Malpractice: Trying to Round Out the Circle,"
27 U. Toronto L. J. 131 (1977).
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victim and injurer categories, the Swedish approach is bound to be
relatively costly. There are too many ad hoc decisions to be made,
and too many borders to be fought over where being on one side of
the line or the other makes too much difference to the parties. And
this is bound to be a serious defect. Second, the decisions as to
which categories warrant special treatment are not totally convinc-
ing. Why pharmaceuticals and not other products? Why not the
bathtub case, if it is plausible that homeowners, or at least elderly
ones, may be induced to shift to showers? Indeed, can anyone tell ex
ante which categories would give rise to significant safety incentives
if full compensation were given? Under a fund, if one kept statistics
(derived by sampling accidents), correlated accident costs with any
number of possibly related activities, and charged taxes on an in-
volvement basis, one might well find that many other safety incen-
tives of significance could be established.
Why not, then, opt for such a fund; why not adopt a New Zea-
land plan which affords more nearly full recovery (at the Swedish
special insurance levels) and which assesses taxes on victim and in-
jurer activities (but with greater differentiation than New Zealand
gives) in order to pay the costs of maintaining the fund? The princi-
pal argument against this must lie in the disadvantages that attach
to governmental approaches of that sort, or to put the same thing in
the opposite way, in the advantages that attach to private arrange-
ments such as the Swedish ones. If I believed that a governmental
fund would make its tax assessment decisions as coldly as would pri-
vate insurance companies (or if I believed it would only deviate from
actuarially-based assessments in those situations where I would wish
to do so to satisfy my political aims), I would have no hesitation in
favoring such an approach over the Swedish one. Since I don't, my
own hope is that the Swedish way can expand so that it eliminates
most compensation differentials and ultimately approaches the
structure of the governmental fund, but with private insurance com-
panies at its center and with assessment decisions made free from
governmental pressures.
At the moment, that is quite a distance from the Swedish ap-
proach. Nor can I tell you, even in rough terms, how one could
move from the Swedish way to a generalized system of privately
structured full accident compensation. It does seem to me, however,
that that approach would have, if established (and supplemented by
uninsurable tort fines), the greatest capacity for meeting the combi-
nation of goals that accident law seeks to achieve. It also seems to
me that of all the approaches extant, the Swedish way has the great-
est potential for evolving into such an approach. And so, whatever
its current inconsistencies and ambiguities, it deserves both praise
and further study.
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